The present paper considers an evidence measure built under the likelihood ratio approach.
Introduction

Preliminaries
In statistics, one of the main interests is to make inferences about unknown quantities by using probability measures. As all natural phenomena are contingent, the inferences about their state are uncertain inferences. A typical type of uncertain inference is to verify if a specific (null) hypothesis H is consistent or inconsistent with the observed data. In the classical statistics, p-values are often used as measures for guiding this type of uncertain inference; the smaller is the p-value, the more inconsistent is the tested hypothesis H with the observed data. For recent definitions of p-values see, for instance, Bickel and Doksum (1977) , Berger and Boos (1994) , Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009) and Patriota (2013) . Couso and Sánches (2008) proposed a fuzzy p-value under imprecise information about the observed quantities.
P -values were firstly popularized by Ronald Fisher in a series of works (Fisher, , 1935a .
On the one hand, a small p-value indicates that "either an exceptionally rare chance has occurred or the theory is not true" (Fisher, 1959, p. 39) . On the other hand, a non-small p-value does not suggest acceptation of the null hypothesis, since "there is no reason for believing that a hypothesis has been proved to be true merely because it is not contradicted by the available facts" (Fisher, 1935c) . In the development of a p-value, it is not mandatory to explicit all possible hypotheses.
In his time, Fisher computed a p-value by fixing only the null hypothesis H to be tested by the observed facts; the negation of H was not defined and, therefore, it may contain much more statements than the probabilistic theory can hold. This is a very general type of uncertain inference, however, optimal procedures are difficult, if not impossible, to derive under this general scenario. Neyman and Pearson (1933) showed that, under some regular conditions, there exists an optimal test in terms of error rates for testing two simple hypotheses. Then, for a fixed level of significance (probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true), there exists a test which provides the highest probability to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. Karlin and Rubin (1956) generalized the latter result to some types of composite hypotheses when the likelihood ratio is monotone. The Fisherian and Neyman-Pearsonian approaches are competitive: the former is related with general uncertain inference and the latter is related with decision theory. A pvalue is, in general, defined under a large scenario not being necessary to define an alternative hypothesis, while the Neyman-Pearson procedure requires an alternative hypothesis to close the universe of possible hypotheses. It is natural that some p-values defined under general scenarios present inadequate behaviors under closed universe of hypotheses -some examples of inadequate behavior of p-values are provided in Goodman and Royall (1988) and Pereira and Wechsler (1993) . Despite many differences of first principles, these two approaches (discussed above) share a common feature, namely, both metrics that regulate the p-value and the critical region strongly depend on each specific null hypothesis. That is, two different null hypotheses are not directly comparable, since each null hypothesis uses different criteria based on different metrics. More specifically, if H and H are two null hypotheses such that H implies H , then, by the logical consequence, we expect to observe more evidence against H than H . This logical feature does not occur for both approaches, since under each H and H we have different metrics (Schervish, 1996; Patriota, 2013) . This issue is recurrently discussed in the statistical literature for advocating in favor of the Bayesian inference, since the use of the posterior distribution guarantees the validity of the logical consequence over the universe of hypotheses. The limitation, however, of the Bayesian procedure is that if the set of statements in the null hypothesis has smaller dimension than the set of statements in the alternative hypothesis, the best posterior probability for the null hypothesis is zero regardless the observed sample. This is a limitation, since, in such cases, the posterior distribution cannot provide a positive number to represent the conflicting degree between the observed data and the claimed hypothesis (i.e., it was decided a priori ).
In the statistical literature, virtually all existent proposals to make uncertain inferences are based on probability measures. The classical approaches make uncertain inferences by considering randomness as a property only of the sample space, i.e., no probability measures are defined over the parameter space (in the parametric case). The Bayesian approach makes uncertain inferences by considering that both sample and parameter spaces are subject to probabilistic uncertainties.
In this paper, we adopt the classical paradigm, therefore, probability measures are defined only for the sample space, however, we show that the defined likelihood-ratio measure can play the role of a posterior measure to make uncertain inferences. This present paper revisits the likelihoodratio measure, showing: 1) some of its properties not well explored in the statistical literature; 2) that it satisfies the logical consequence and can be interpreted in terms of displacements from the maximum likelihood; 3) that it can be used for testing very general null hypotheses; 4) that it is an upper bound for posterior probabilities. We discuss some of its peculiar rules and how to interpret it satisfactorily to make uncertain inferences.
The likelihood ratio approach has a long history in the statistical literature. Neyman and Pearson (1933) demonstrated that the test based on the likelihood ratio statistics is the most powerful one for a fixed level of significance under simple hypotheses. Birkes (1990) studied the relation between generalized likelihood ratio tests and uniformly most powerful tests. Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009) studied optimal features for some p-values based on the likelihood ratio statistics for very general null hypotheses. Sprott (2000) provided examples for confidence regions not based on the likelihood ratio statistics that produce absurd regions. Severini (2000) discussed likelihood methods in statistics and provided also, on page 79, a counter-example to the likelihood principle -we discuss this example in Section 2.5. Royall (1997) examined the likelihood ratio to quantify the weight of evidence for one hypothesis over another and provided many examples and limitations of the traditional statistical inference. Royall (2000) investigated the probability of observing misleading evidence for the likelihood ratio approach. Giant and Shenoy (2005) justified an axiomatic system of decision theory by using the likelihood ratio approach. Blume (2008) provided a tutorial on likelihood methods for measuring statistical evidence. More recently, Bickel (2012) generalized the law of likelihood for composite hypotheses and derived several properties.
These authors postulate the existence of a true probability the governs the data behavior, but this "true" probability can always be understood just as a shorthand to a more complex interpretation without adopting a realist perspective. Patriota (2013) built a measure of evidence based on likelihood-ratio confidence regions and compared this measure with a specific p-value approach.
In the present paper, we discuss and provide some interpretations for the likelihood-ratio measure with the purpose of revitalizing and reinforcing the use of this (new/old) measure in the discipline of Statistics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.2 presents some notations used in this paper, Section 2 defines the likelihood-ratio measure and exposes some properties not well known in the statistical literature, Subsection 2.2 illustrates the methodology with the Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions, Subsection 2.3 provides a comparison with the Bayesian approach. Relations with previous works are presented in Subsection 2.4, some criticisms of the likelihood approach are addressed in Subsection 2.5. Section 3 discusses how to test sharp and non-sharp hypotheses with the likelihood-ratio measure, Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 explore each scenario for two hypotheses.
Finally, Section 4 presents an application to the Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium.
Notations
In this paper we adopt the set-measure representation, because it is simple, elegant, powerful and it avoids ambiguity. The statistical model is the triplet (X , F, P), where X ⊆ R n is the sample space,
F is a list of measurable subsets of X (a sigma-field) and P is a family of well-defined probability measures that possibly explain the observed data. Here, each measure in P ∈ P is dominated by a sigma-finite measure µ (that is, µ(A) = 0 ⇒ P (A) = 0 for all P ∈ P and A ∈ F). The likelihood function is then formally defined to be one version of the Radon-Nikodym derivative
where x ∈ X , A ∈ F, P ∈ P and dP dµ (x) is a set containing all versions that are equal except for a set of µ-measure zero. Naturally, L(P, x) must be a non-pathological version in dP dµ (x), i.e., it is assumed that 0 < sup
holds. The Condition (C 1 ) will guarantee valid many of the properties presented in this paper. If this supremum is zero for some x ∈ X , then the family P in the statistical model was not well defined and should be replaced by an appropriated family.
The majority of statistical models can be represented by the triplet (X , F, P), for instance, regression models, mixed models, structural models, multivariate models, non-parametric models and so forth. The parametric model emerges when there exists a finite dimensional space Θ ⊆ R k , with k < ∞, such that P = {P θ : θ ∈ Θ}. In the first part of the paper, the vector θ is considered to be a fixed indexer of probabilities, i.e., no prior probability over Θ is specified. In the second part, the results derived in this paper are compared with the Bayesian approach and, under this framework, a prior over Θ is specified.
Some statisticians are habituated to start the modeling by defining the density functions or conditional density functions of the involved random variables. These modellings can always be rewritten in terms of the above triplet. For instance, in the former case: let X ∈ X be a random vector such that X ∼ f θ (·), where f θ is a probability density function and θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R k . The statistical model is recovered by noting that F = β(X ) is the Borel σ-field for X and P θ (A) = A f θ (x)dx, where A ∈ F. Thus, the triplet emerges (X , F, P), where
If X is discrete, then F = 2 X and P θ (X = x) ≡ f θ (x). In a more general case, when X is a mixture of discrete and continuous processes, the statistical model (X , F, P) may be seen as an induced model by the random variable X : (Ω, A, M) → (X , F, P), where the family of probability measures M must be dominated by a sigma-finite measure. For conditional specifications, we have, for instance, the following: let X ∈ X and γ ∈ Γ ⊆ R p be two continuous random vectors, defined on the same space, such that X|γ ∼ g(·|γ) and γ ∼ π θ (·). The variable γ is, in general, not observable. The statistical model is defined just for observable variables, therefore, in this case we must compute the marginal density of X by integrating the joint distribution over Γ, namely, f θ (x) = Γ g(x|γ)π θ (γ)dγ and now we back to the former case (the discrete case is analogous).
In other words, we always use the marginal statistical model related with the observable random variables, because the likelihood function for the joint vectors (X, γ) depend on the non-observable random vector γ.
All statistical hypotheses contain only statements about subsets of P, i.e., all hypotheses should be of the type: H ≡ H(P 0 ) ≡ "The family P 0 contains at least one probability measure that potentially generates the data behavior", where P 0 ⊆ P. A short notation to represent the same will be preferred, namely, "H : P ∈ P 0 " . In this paper, the universe of hypotheses restricted to the family P is defined by H = {H(P 0 ) : P 0 ⊆ P}. The two extreme cases are H(∅) and H(P), we shall see in this paper that the likelihood-ratio measure sets impossibility for the former and full possibility for the latter. Moreover, we consider here that
and H(P 0 ) ∧ H(P 1 ) ≡ H(P 0 ∩ P 1 ). As for each P 0 ⊆ P we have a hypothesis H(P 0 ) ∈ H, the same measure defined over the subsets of P can also be defined over H. Note that, if P is uncountable, then, by using the choice axiom, it is not possible to define a probability measure over H (some elements are not measurable in the probabilistic sense), in contrast, we shall see that the likelihood-ratio measure is well defined for testing all elements of H.
The likelihood-ratio measure
Why use the likelihood for measuring the consistence of a hypothesis? First, the likelihood function is a non-negative function that relates each unobservable probability measure P ∈ P with an observable data x ∈ X . Second, the larger is the value of L(P, x), the better is the agreement between the probability P and the observed data, see the law of likelihood discussed in (Hacking, 1965, p. 71) . According to the measure theory, L(P, x) is one version of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of P with respect to µ at the point x. In the discrete case, the likelihood function is
, then L ranks the probabilities in P from those that make x most probable to those that make x less probable. In the continuous case, it can be interpreted as the instantaneous rate of change of P at x, then L ranks the probabilities in P from those with the high instantaneous rate of change at x to those with small instantaneous rate of change at x.
The likelihood ratio statistic is defined by
for P ∈ P and x ∈ X * ≡ {w ∈ X : sup P ∈P L(P, w) < ∞}. The set X * is important to restrict the observed values to the cases where the likelihood ratio statistic (2.1) is well-defined. If it is observed x ∈ X * , then λ will be ill-defined and other definition should be used. In this paper, besides condition (C 1 ), it is assumed also that x ∈ X * throughout this paper.
Definition and properties
Definition 2.1. For each fixed x ∈ X * , let ν x : 2 P → [0, 1] be a set function such that
λ(P, x) and ν x (∅) = 0, (2.2)
where P 1 ⊆ P is a non-empty set. We call ν x by likelihood-ratio measure (LR-measure).
By Condition (C 1 ), the LR-measure ν x is a well-defined function over 2 P . This measure ν x is known in the statistical literature as the general likelihood ratio statistic and it is typically used for building hypothesis testings and confidence regions. Although, it is known many (asymptotic)
properties of ν x (P 1 ) when x varies over X , little is known about its properties for a fixed x ∈ X * .
By knowing the properties of ν x , for a fixed sample x, it is possible to derive rules to identify which probabilities in P are more plausible to explain this observed data. The repeated sampling principle will not be considered as a criterion to specify the plausibility of the subsets of P, since
x is fixed and observed.
An axiomatic approach for decision theory based on ν x was developed by Giant and Shenoy (2005) considering a parametric model. It is also possible to extend their axiomatic theory to the general statistical model considered here (not necessarily parametric), but it is not the main goal of the present paper.
In the following, some properties of ν x are attained straightforwardly from its definition, which explicit that ν x is a non-additive measure -see Denneberg (1994) , for details on non-additive measures. Let P 1 , P 2 ⊆ P, then
The above properties P 1 -P 3 indicate that ν x is a possibility measure over the subsets of P (see Zadeh, 1978 , for details on possibility measures). Property P 4 says that the LR-measure satisfies the entailment condition. By these properties, it is possible to prescribe how to infer by using the LR-measure for a fixed sample x ∈ X * .
First, notice that by P 1 and P 2 , ν x (P 1 ) = 1 or ν x (P c 1 ) = 1 for any P 1 ⊆ P and, also, on the contrary to the probability rules,
In words: if no evidence against P 1 is observed, then it does not imply that full evidence against P c 1 is observed. This is in accordance with the coherent reasoning, since, by definition, ν x (P 1 ) = 1 means that there exists P ∈ P 1 with (almost) maximum likelihood and ν x (P c 1 ) = 0 means that all P ∈ P c 1 have zero likelihood. That is, ν x indicates a type of consistency degrees rather than probability degrees. Some statisticians might find the above properties undesirable, for one cannot use all known theorems from the probability theory, moreover, the probability axioms have justifications in terms of desiderata (de Finetti, 1931; Cox, 1946; Paris, 2006) and wages (de Finetti, 1931) . Nonetheless, these justifications are not provided only for the probability axioms, the possibility axioms also have such justifications (see Marichal, 2000; Dubois et al., 2008, for instance). The first three evident interpretations of the LR-measure follows:
(A) ν x (P 1 ) = 1 occurs whenever the observed data do not bring information against P 1 , according to the likelihood function. That is, P 1 is consistent with the observed data.
(B) ν x (P 1 ) < 1 occurs whenever the observed data do bring some information against P 1 , according to the likelihood function. That is, P 1 has some inconsistence degree with the observed data.
(C) ν x (P 1 ) < ν x (P 2 ) occurs whenever the observed data do bring more information against P 1 than against P 2 , according to the likelihood function. That is, P 1 is more inconsistence with the observed data than P 2 .
From P 1 -P 4 and (A)-(B), it is possible to devise more three interpretations that will be used on hypothesis testings.
(D) if ν x ({P }) = 1 for all P ∈ P, then all elements of P are equally possible. This happens because all probability measures reach the maximum likelihood and, therefore, all measures are equally consistent with the observed data, given the family P.
(E) if ν x ({P 0 }) = 1 and ν x ({P }) = 0 for all P ∈ P\{P 0 }, then the observed data indicate necessity of P 0 and impossibility, in terms of likelihoods, for all other P ∈ P\{P 0 }. This happens because only P 0 reaches the maximum likelihood and all others P have zero likelihood. In this context, P 0 is the only measure consistent with the observed data while all the others are totally inconsistent, given the family P.
(F) if ν x (P 0 ) = 1 and ν x (P c 0 ) ≈ 0 (near zero), then the observed data bring strong evidence against P c 0 . This happens because only probability measures in P 0 reach the maximum likelihood while its complement yields very low likelihoods. Here, P 1 is consistent with the observed data and its complement is strongly inconsistent, given the family P.
In order to make interpretations in terms of percentages of the maximum likelihood, let P 0 be a closed set and if for each fixed x ∈ X * there exists at least one measure in P that reaches the maximum likelihood, that is,P
then the quantity ν x (P 0 ) = ν 0 indicates that the highest likelihood produced by the elements of P 0 equals ν 0 100% of the maximum likelihood.
It is easy to verify this claim, since by condition (2.4) and the closure of P 0 , we have
That is, in this context, ν x (P 0 ) provides a number for the best possible choice in P 0 in terms of maximum likelihood proportions. In any case, the smaller is the value of ν x (P 0 ), the farther is the set P 0 from the best possible choices in P. If all elements of P 0 generate small likelihoods compared to the maximum likelihood, the set P 0 must be considered "improvable" or "implausible" in the sense that the observed data are not corroborating to any element of P 0 . For many regular statistical models, the setP x contains just one element, which is known as the maximum likelihood estimative. However, in our general setting, the family P may contain models that are not identifiable and therefore the setP x will contain more than one element. For instance, let X = R and each P θ ∈ P is a normal probability with variance one and mean µ 1 + µ 2 . The parameter vector in this example is θ = (µ 1 , µ 2 ) and, for this case, for each x ∈ X , we havê
Notice that, any set P 0 ⊆ P such that P 0 ∩P x = ∅ will have full LR-measure (full possibility) for a fixed x ∈ X * , that is, ν x (P 0 ) = 1. In other words, the lack of identifiability is not an impediment to make inferences under the LR-measure. The identifiability of parameters is required to guarantee asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimators (uniqueness, consistency, etc.), as we are dealing with a pure statistical model and families of probabilities rather than parameter spaces, this condition is not necessary. Naturally, the identifiability can help to have more precise inference, but it is not strictly needed here.
In order to elaborate any conclusions about the amount of evidence against P 0 , by the relation exposed in Equation (2.3), it is mandatory to compute either ν x (P 0 ) and ν x (P In order to provide a geometrical interpretation of the LR-measure, Lemma 2.1 offers an equivalent definition for ν x .
Lemma 2.1. For each P ∈ P and x ∈ X * ,
where
The proof is straightforward, since for each x ∈ X * and P ∈ P
Lemma 2.1 helps us to interpret graphically the distance between a specific probability measure P and the set containing elements with the highest likelihoodP x . Assuming valid (2.4), the set
. Moreover, the setP x can be seen as the center of Λ α (x) in the following sense:
From Lemma 2.1 and properties P 1 and P 3 , the following general form is attained 6) for any subfamily P 1 ⊆ P, where sup(∅) = −∞. It is noteworthy that Equation (2.6) is similar to the one proposed by Patriota (2013) , see Definition 2.3 of the latter paper. The main difference is that, in Patriota (2013), Λ α was defined, under a parametric context, by the confidence region built on the likelihood ratio statistics. Later on, Martin and Liu (2014) and Martin (2014) presented some discussions similar to those in Patriota (2013) .
It is useful to specialize the above results to the parametric model P = {P θ : Θ ⊂ R k }, where k < ∞. In this context, all quantities can be written in terms of the parametric subspaces
In practice, it is possible to represent graphically the relation with P 0 andP x by the set Λ ν0 (x), where ν 0 = ν(P 0 ). The set Λ ν0 (x) highlights the distance between P 0 andP x , i.e., the more distant is the border of Λ ν0 from its center, the more implausible is P 0 for the given observed data x, see Section 4 for an application.
To sum up, this section presented and discussed some important properties P 1 -P 4 of the LRmeasure and their interpretative implications (A)-(F) that were not well-explored in the statistical literature. By using these properties, it is possible to create a ranking of all subsets of P (or subsets of Θ, in the parametric context) describing the degree of adequacy according to their respective likelihood values.
Some illustrative examples
In order to illustrate the simplicity of the methodology, we present three simple examples from Binomial, Poisson and Normal distributions in Figures 1, 2 and 3, respectively. As we shall see, this methodology can be easily applied by any undergraduate student.
The genuine likelihood functions are employed for each example. In the normal case, we have two parameters, namely, the location µ and scale σ 2 , but here we will be interested in verifying the plausibility of σ 2 ≤ 1.5. In this context, µ can be considered as a nuisance parameter, as we shall see it is not necessary to resort to integrated or profiled likelihood functions.
Binomial example: Let X be a binomial random variable, i.e., X = {0, 1, . . . , n}, P θ (X =
) for x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0, 1). Figure 1 shows the values of likelihood-ratio measure for all observable values from a Binomial random variable with n = 8, the full horizontal segment represents the set Θ 0 = [0.4, 0.6]. Here, the likelihood-ratio measure is
Observe that, for either x = 0 and x = 8, Figures 1(a) and ( Poisson example: Let X be a Poisson random variable, i.e., X = {0, 1, . . .}, P θ (X = x) = exp(−θ)θ x /x! for x ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0, ∞). Normal example: Let X be a normal sample, i.e.,
where m x is the sample mean and s 2 x is the sample variance (the denominator is n) and θ = (µ, σ 2 ) ∈ Θ ≡ R × R + . In this case, we have two parameters and a simple graphical visualization is through the set Λ α . Figure 3 presents the smallest contour for which Λ α has at least one element in common with Θ 0 = {(µ, σ 2 ) ∈ Θ : σ 2 ≤ 1.5} (the full line)
for some observable sample mean m x and variance s 2
x from a Normal sample of size n = 20, the dashed area represents the set Θ 0 . Here, the likelihood measure is
Observe that, the set Θ 0 represents our interest in σ 
Comparison with the Bayesian approach
In the Bayesian inference, all inferences are based on the posterior probability defined over the parameter space. In this paper, it was studied an inference procedure based on a possibility measure over the same parameter space rather than a probability one. This section provides a comparison of these two strictly different approaches under parametric models. As these two procedures use different rules, they must have different interpretation.
In the Bayesian framework, a prior probability π(θ) (dominated by a sigma-finite measure ξ) Figure 3: Likelihood-ratio measures for Θ 0 = {(µ, σ 2 ) ∈ Θ : σ 2 ≤ 1.5} for some observable values of the sample mean and variance from a random sample of a Normal distribution with n = 20. The cross mark is the maximum likelihood estimate. The set Θ 0 is represented by the dashed area. The full line is the smallest contour for which Λ α has at least one element in common with Θ 0 . is defined over the parameter space Θ and a posterior is attained through
where m(x) = Θ L(P θ , x)dπ(θ). This posterior distribution is a well-defined measure of support over the measurable subsets of Θ, i.e., the posterior probability of Θ 0 given the observed data x is defined by
where the integral is the Lebesgue integral. If π x (Θ 0 ) is very small, then the set Θ 0 must be regarded as improbable. The value π x (Θ c 0 ) is completely determined by knowing π x (Θ 0 ), since
This feature does not hold for the LR-measure ν x , e.g., for the same observed sample x we may
(these implications are valid by
Properties P 1 and P 2 ), that is,
In words, although there is an increasing in the ν x -values from Θ 0 to Θ 1 , the ν x -values of Θ c 0 and Θ c 1 are the very same. Secondly, as the sum rule governs the posterior probability measure, the probability of an uncountable set cannot be recovered from the probabilities of each of its elements.
It does not occur with ν x (·), since, by definition, the ν x -value of an uncountable set is obtained from the ν x -value of each of its constituents through the supremum function. This feature poses the LR-measure ν x in advantage when it comes to testing sharp hypothesis of the type: "the probability P θ0 potentially generates the observed data", since whenever Θ is uncountable, the posterior probability will attach probability zero to the above quoted event even when P θ0 fits adequately the observed data.
The LR-measure can be viewed as a classical counterpart of the posterior distribution, nevertheless, as it has seen above, the rules that govern both measures are quite different and hence the interpretations must differ. The following result explicits a relation between ν x and any posterior probability.
Lemma 2.2. Let (X , F, P) be a statistical model where P = {P θ : θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R k } is a parametric probability family (dominated by a sigma-finite measure) and k < ∞. Also, let π be a prior probability (dominated by a sigma-finite measure) defined over a measurable list of subsets of Θ.
Assume valid Condition (C 1 ), then, for any π-measurable Θ 0 such that π(Θ 0 ) > 0,
for any x ∈ X * , where c(x) = sup P θ ∈P L(P θ , x).
Proof. As x ∈ X * and c(x) < ∞, the posterior probability can be written as
It is noteworthy that ν x is defined over the power set of Θ, while the posterior distribution is defined on the measurable subsets (in the Lebesgue sense) of Θ. Thus, there exist subsets of Θ that are not measurable for π x but are computable for ν x . Notice that, from Equation (2.8) of Lemma 2.2, ν x (Θ 0 ) = 0 ⇒ π x (Θ 0 ) = 0 but the converse is not true, for there exist prior probabilities that induce probability zero for Θ 0 even when sup θ∈Θ0 λ(P θ , x) > 0. This shows that the ν x -value behavior is in agreement with the expected reasoning between possibility and probability:
"a high degree of possibility does not imply a high degree of probability, nor does a low degree of probability imply a low degree of possibility. However, if an event is impossible, it is bound to be improbable." (Zadeh, 1978) Moreover, Lemma 2.2 provides an upper bound for the posterior probability of Θ 0 .
Corollary 2.1. Assume valid the Lemma 2.2's assumptions. Then, for each π-measurable Θ 0 such
Notice that the extra condition of the Corollary 2.1 is not vacuous, since
c(x) ≤ 1 by the following
Corollary 2.1 is valid for subsets of Θ with low prior probabilities relative to m(x)/c(x). Dubois and Prade (1982) argued that a consistency principle between probability and possibility can be mathematically stated as Probability(A) ≤ Possibility(A) for all measurable A (in a probability sense). The possibility of an event is interpreted by Shackle (1961) as "the lack of surprise when it occurs". Based on this interpretation, Dubois and Prade (1982) claim: "An event that often occurs is not very surprising and then it seems very possible that it happens; on the other hand, events which are not very possible do not often occur and are surprising. Then by an inductive reasoning, we are conducted to suppose that if an event seldom occurs, it must be less possible than events which often occur." Corollary 2.1 establishes when this consistency principle occurs for posterior probabilities and the LR-measure.
It is worth saying that only optimization procedures are required in the computation of ν x (Θ 0 ), no integrations are required. Computing a posterior probability can be a harsh task in some high dimensional problems, therefore, an upper bound of the posterior probability can be attained by Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 2.1 in terms of ν x . That is, if the ν x -value is small for an event, then the correlative posterior probability must be even smaller (under the specified conditions).
Other works on the Likelihood-ratio approach
Unfortunately, in the statistical literature there are few works addressing the likelihood approach in the context of the present paper. The law of likelihood to compare two hypotheses was studied by Royall (1997) , Royall (2000) and Bickel (2012) , this law of likelihood can be represented by using our notation as follows
provided that, ν x (P 2 ) > 0. In our paper the likelihood-ratio measure is relative to the maximum likelihood, that is, all possibly computed likelihoods for the family P are compared with the highest likelihood. Some features of R x can be derived by using the properties P 1 -P 4 and (A)-(F), but this is not the focus of the present paper.
In a paper published by the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Walley and Moral (1999) proposed two methods based on likelihoods for statistical models with a finite parametric space Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ r }. The methods are 1) the upper and lower probabilities defined, respectively, by
and 2) the Bayesian posterior probability derived from a uniform prior distribution
The authors defined types of likelihood measures that satisfy some properties of a probability measure. Some works in the Fuzzy literature use measures based on likelihoods, but none of them address the point treated in this paper. For instance, Dubois et al. (1997) In the Artificial Intelligence Journal, Giant and Shenoy (2005) proposed an axiomatic decision theory based on ν x under parametric models. Therefore, justifications in terms of lost functions are also available for the likelihood-ratio measure.
Criticisms and limitations of the likelihood ratio approach
In this paper, we consider only the information provided by the 'observed' likelihood and external information sources are not used (so far, it was not necessary to resort on the repeating sampling principle). Despite that, in this paper we are not embracing the likelihood principle as the only principle to make good inferences. There are some examples, based on anomalous likelihood functions, illustrating that information beyond the likelihood function is necessary for proper statistical inference (Fraser et al., 1985; Severini, 2000, example 3.5) . In this section, we discuss the first anomalous (flat) likelihood function presented in Fraser et al. (1985) and the Example 3.5 presented in Severini (2000) .
Fraser, Monete and Ng's Example: Let (X , F, P) such that X = {1, 2, . . .}, F = 2 X and P = {P θ : θ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}}, where P θ is defined as follows That is, in this example, for a given x, the LR-measure indicates possibility one for θ = x/2 , 2x, 2x + 1 and impossibility for any other values. That is all the information we can extract from the likelihood-ratio measure. However, "the smallest of the three possible θ values provides a confidence procedure with 2/3 confidence" (Fraser et al., 1985) , i.e.,
It means that there is an external information that is not regarded in the likelihood-ratio measure and can help to discriminate which values are more probable than others. However, the procedure (2.10) uses the "repeated sampling principle", that is, if the experiment is repeated, the quantity X 2 will be equal to θ, in average and under the law P θ , 2/3 of times. Notice that it does not mean at all that the statement "θ = x 2 " is more plausible than the others, namely, "θ = 2x" and "θ = 2x + 1", for a fixed observation x. For a fixed value x, all statements "θ = x 2 ", "θ = 2x" and "θ = 2x + 1" are equally plausible with respect to the likelihood-ratio measure.
Since the underlying principles are different, the two interpretations must be different, therefore one should not be used as a counter-argument for the other.
Severini's Example: Let (X , F, P) such that X = {1, 2, . . .}, F = 2 X and P = {P θ : θ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}}, where P θ is defined as follows: if θ = 1 or θ is even, then
where · denotes the smallest integer greater or equal to the argument. If θ is an odd number greater than one, then
24 , for x = 2θ, 2θ + 1, 0, otherwise.
For a given x, the likelihood function is , if x = 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . , 0, otherwise, and the likelihood-ratio measure is given by
2 , 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 1, if x = (θ − 1)/2 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . , , if x = 2θ, 2θ + 1 and θ = 3, 5, 7, 9, . . . , 0, otherwise.
Clearly, the likelihood-ratio measure indicates that "θ = 2x+1" produces the highest likelihood, the other possible values (with positive LR-measure) attain at least 70% of the maximum likelihood.
Nonetheless, note that this point with the highest likelihood has probability
Define the statistic
Severini (2000), on page 80, shows that
which proofs that "the point with smaller likelihood is more likely to be equal to θ [than the point with the highest likelihood]" (Severini, 2000, p. 80) . For this latter conclusion to be valid, the repeated sampling principle must be evoked, because the word likely is restricted to ensembles of the sample space.
In these two examples and in many others, the repeated sampling principle is embraced only rhetorically and, in general, it is not effectively executed in the majority of actual problems. That is, one sample is observed and a conclusion should be drawn from this single observed sample. As this principle is not universally accepted, I strongly believe that these examples do not produce a valid contra-argument against the likelihood-ratio measure. Personally, I did not reject the repeated sampling principle, but I strongly believe that it (or any other principle) should not be imposed to drive all types of uncertain inferences, mainly inasmuch as there are some examples where methods with good long run properties are inadmissible and incoherent in a specific sense.
Sharp and non-sharp hypothesis testings
Besides being applied as a support measure over the subsets of P, the LR-measure ν x may also be employed for testing a null hypothesis H 0 : P ∈ P 0 . Here, two types of hypothesis testings can be conducted, one based on Fisherian philosophy and another based on the Neyman-Pearson philosophy. The Fisherian philosophy considers that the family P cannot exhaustively list all mechanisms that possibly generate the observed sample, therefore, the alternative hypothesis is always ill-defined and it is only reasonable to reject the null hypothesis. The Neyman-Pearson philosophy considers that the family may list exhaustively all possible mechanisms that generate the observed data and, given this family, the alternative hypothesis is well-defined and it is reasonable to accept or to reject the null hypothesis.
The hypothesis H 0 is sharp when dim(P 0 ) < dim(P) and it is non-sharp when dim(P 0 ) = dim(P), where dim() is the Lebesgue dimension. On the one hand, in a general setting, it is non-trivial to compute p-values for non-sharp hypotheses, since, depending on the geometry of P 0 , the limiting distribution of the usual likelihood ratio statistics may be other than the chi-square distribution (see Drton, 2009 , for specific details). As the Wald and Score statistics are connected with the likelihood ratio statistic, the same issue is expected to occur with these statistics. A study on optimal p-values under special cases of sharp and non-sharp null hypotheses is provided in Mudholkar and Chaubey (2009) . On the other hand, under sharp null hypotheses, the posterior probability cannot provide a positive measure and the alternative Bayes factor is not a consistent measure (see Lavine and Schervish, 1999, for details Definition 3.1. There are indications to reject H 0 (or accept H 1 ), given the family P, when (i) the observed data bring (strong) evidence against H 0 , i.e., ν x (P 0 ) ≈ 0 (small enough);
(ii) the observed data bring no evidence against H 1 , i.e., ν x (P c 0 ) = 1.
When the observed data do not provide evidence against H 0 , i.e., ν x (P 0 ) = 1, by the properties of ν x , it does not necessarily imply that the same data provide strong evidence against the alternative H 1 . If this occurs, we have indications to accept H 0 . Then, we define conditions for accepting H 0 .
Definition 3.2. There are indications to accept H 0 (or reject H 1 ), given the family P, when (i) the observed data bring no evidence against H 0 , i.e., ν x (P 0 ) = 1;
(ii) the observed data bring strong evidence against H 1 , i.e., ν x (P c 0 ) ≈ 0 (small enough).
That is, it is not sufficient to observe "no evidence" against H 0 to accept H 0 , also it is necessary to observe (strong) evidence against H 1 . If min(ν x (P 0 ), ν x (P c 0 )) is not small enough, then there are no indications to either reject or accept the null hypothesis. In this latter case, we should maintain both hypotheses and collect more data or more information to make further conclusions. It must be clear that we can only accept H 0 restricted to the options in P, it is not an unconditional decision, it is a decision given the family of possible choices P. Furthermore, it is not conditional in the probabilistic sense, it is conditional in the possibilistic sense, for there is no probability measure over P.
It should be noticed that if the null hypothesis is H 0 : P ∈P x , whereP x is defined in (2.4), then, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we should only accept this hypothesis if ν x (P c x ) ≈ 0 (small enough).
For instance,
θ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.9}}, assume that n = 100 and the observed data is x = 99. Then, the LR-measure is ν x ({P θ }) = 10 θ 0.9 99 (1 − θ) andP x = P 0.9 . If the null hypothesis is H 0 : P ∈P x , we have ν x (P x ) = 1 and ν x (P c x ) ≈ 10 −64 , therefore, given this family P, we observe evidence to accept H 0 , since the setP c x = {P 0.1 , P 0.2 } is almost impossible.
for each P 0 ⊆ P. This function will be used for testing H 0 against H 1 . Two extreme decisions follow: Φ x (P 0 ) = 1, 0 is the maximal value for H 0 , therefore H 0 should be readily accepted, for the possibility of P c 0 is zero; Φ x (P 0 ) = 0, 1 is the minimal value for H 0 , therefore H 0 should be readily rejected, the possibility of P 0 is zero.
The above prescriptions are just representing the properties of ν x for any subset P 0 ⊆ P.
In practice, it is observed something between the maximal and minimal values and the types of decisions depend on the restrictiveness of the involved hypotheses.
3.1 H 0 and H 1 are both non-sharp hypotheses
In this section, H 0 and H 1 are both non-sharp hypotheses, that is, dim(P 0 ) = dim(P c 0 ) = dim(P).
Two arrangements are possible, namely
(1) Φ x (P 0 ) = 1, b , with b ∈ [0, 1], ifP x ⊂ P 0 . In this first case, if b is sufficiently small, H 0 should be accepted, given the family P.
(2) Φ x (P 0 ) = a, 1 , with a ∈ [0, 1], ifP x ⊂ P c 0 . In this second case, if a is sufficiently small, H 0 should be rejected, given the family P.
Observe that, Φ x (P 0 ) = 1, 1 wheneverP x ∩ P 0 ∩ P c 0 = ∅, where P 0 is the closure of P 0 . Based on these two arrangements, it is allowed three types of decisions, namely: (1) acceptation of H 0 , given the family P. That is, the observed sample x does not bring evidence against P 0 , but it brings strong evidence against P c 0 (if b ≈ 0); (2) rejection of H 0 , given the family P. That is, the observed sample x brings strong evidence against P 0 (if a ≈ 0), but it does not bring evidence against P c 0 ; and (3) without evidence to neither accept nor reject H 0 , given the family P. That is, the observed sample x does not bring evidence against either P 0 and P c 0 (if b, a ≈ 0).
H 0 is sharp and H 1 is non-sharp
In this section, H 0 is a sharp hypothesis and H 1 is a non-sharp hypothesis. Assume the following condition: for each proper non-empty subset P 0 ⊂ P,
Condition (C 2 ) is saying that there is no "gap" between P 0 and P c 0 as in the Binomial example presented in Section 3. As dim(P 0 ) < dim(P c 0 ) = dim(P), the maximum likelihood setP x will have a non-empty intersection with the closure of P c 0 , for this reason ν x (P c 0 ) = 1. In this case, the observed data will never produce evidence against H 1 , therefore, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we can only find evidence to reject H 0 . Here, it is allowed only two types of decisions, namely: (2) rejection of H 0 , that is, the observed sample x brings strong evidence against P 0 (if a ≈ 0); and (3) without evidence to either accept or reject H 0 , that is, the observed sample x does not bring evidence against P 0 (if a ≈ 0).
H 0 is non-sharp and H 1 is sharp
In this section, H 0 is a non-sharp hypothesis and H 1 is a sharp hypothesis. A similar analysis as was done in Section 3.2 follows. Assume also valid Condition (C 2 ), then as dim(P c 0 ) < dim(P 0 ) = dim(P), the maximum likelihood setP x will always have a non-empty intersection with the closure of P 0 , this implies ν x (P 0 ) = 1. In this case, the observed data will never produce evidence against H 0 , therefore, by Definitions 3.2 and 3.1, we can only find evidence to accept H 0 . Here, it is allowed only the following two types of decisions, namely: (1) acceptation of H 0 , that is, the observed sample x brings strong evidence against P 
Discussion on threshold values
If a (or b) is not sufficiently small, we cannot reject (accept) H 0 . In this case, we maintain H 0 as a hypothesis to be verified by using further data. In practice, we can define a small threshold for a and b in terms of the maximum likelihood value. For instance, consider the case Φ x (P 0 ) = a, 1 (respectively, Φ x (P 0 ) = 1, b ), if we set the threshold a * = 0.01 (or b * = 0.01), then we will reject (or accept) the null hypothesis whenever the highest likelihood produced by the elements in P 0 (or in P c 0 ) is lesser than 1% of the maximum likelihood value. These thresholds values a * and b * can be derived from loss functions, error probabilities or any other procedure. Moreover, these thresholds values may take into account the sample size, for the curvature of the likelihood function is affected by it. Some authors (Royall, 2000; Blume, 2008; Bickel, 2012) advise computing the probability of misleading evidence for R x , given in Equation (2.9). The justification is that "observations can truly constitute strong evidence supporting one distribution when the other is true" (Royall, 2000) .
This perspective explicitly assumes a true measure that governs the data behavior. In this paper, we did not assume, in any moment, the existence of a true measure, here we are just comparing all likelihoods relative to the maximum likelihood for an observed sample. In this paper, we endorse a perspective based on the likelihood function and we do not apply a "long-run of trials" perspective in order to avoid the same controversies of the p-values.
Application to the Hardy-Weinberg Equilibrium
In this section we apply the above results to analyze genotype frequencies in a population. When the genotype frequencies of a given population remain constant from generation to generation, it is said that the population is under the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. In this section, we investigate three situations, namely: 1) the population is under the Hardy Weinberg equilibrium; 2) the population is undergoing a regular system of 'inbreeding' (when relatives produce offspring); and
3) the population is undergoing a regular system of 'outbreeding' (when very genetically different individuals produce offspring). These situations will be formalized mathematically in the sequel.
Let AA, Aa and aa be the possible genotypes and θ 1 , θ 2 and θ 3 their respective population frequencies, where the parameter vector is θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 ) with θ 1 + θ 2 + θ 3 = 1. Let (X , F, P) be a parametric statistical model, where X = {(y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) ∈ N 3 : y 1 + y 2 + y 3 = m}, with m ∈ N a fixed value, F = 2 X and each P θ ∈ P is defined by where A ∈ F is a measurable set. The parameter space is Θ = {θ ∈ [0, 1] 3 : θ 1 + θ 2 + θ 3 = 1}.
For the observed sample x = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ), the likelihood function and the likelihood ratio statistics where θ = ( θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 2 ), θ 3 = (1 − θ 1 ) 2 , θ 2 = 1 − θ 1 − (1 − θ 1 ) 2 , and θ 1 = (m+y1−y3) 2 4m 2
. Notice that, dim(Θ 1 ) = 1, dim(Θ 2 ) = dim(Θ 3 ) = dim(Θ) = 2, also note that for θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 > 0, log(λ(x, θ)) is concave. Therefore, θ ∈ Θ 2 or θ ∈ Θ 3 , and we have three situations 1. If θ ∈ Θ 2 , then ν x (Θ 2 ) = 1 and ν x (Θ 3 ) = ν x (Θ 1 ).
2. If θ ∈ Θ 3 , then ν x (Θ 3 ) = 1 and ν x (Θ 2 ) = ν x (Θ 1 ).
3. If θ ∈ Θ 2 ∩ Θ 3 , then ν x (Θ i ) = 1, for i = 1, 2, 3
where A is the closure of set A. Each plot in Figure 4 refers to a specific observe sample, for instance plot (A1) refers to y 1 = 1 and y 3 = 2, plot (A2) refers to y 1 = 1 and y 3 = 3 and so forth. In each plot, the cross mark indicates the maximum likelihood estimate for (θ 1 , θ 3 ) and the full lines surrounding the ML estimates are the smallest contours for which Λ α has at least one element in common with Θ 1 .
On the one hand, in the plots (A1)-(A6), (B1)-(B4), (C6), (D1)-(D4), (E5)-(E6) and (F1) the maximum likelihood lies in Θ 2 , that is, it is favoring the inbreeding restriction. Notice that only for some cases this favoring seems to be relevant (e.g., ν x -values less than 0.1):
• (A1): y 1 = 1, y 3 = 2 ⇒ ν x (Θ 3 ) = 0.004,
• (A2): y 1 = 1, y 3 = 3 ⇒ ν x (Θ 3 ) = 0.015,
• (A3): y 1 = 1, y 3 = 4 ⇒ ν x (Θ 3 ) = 0.044,
• (C6): y 1 = 5, y 3 = 0 ⇒ ν x (Θ 3 ) = 0.008.
On the other hand, in the plots (B6), (C1)-(C5), (D6), (E1)-(E4) and (F2)-(F6) the maximum likelihood lies in Θ 3 , that is, is favoring the outbreeding restriction. Notice that only for some cases this favoring seems to be relevant (ν x -values less than 0.1):
Figure 4: The dashed curves represent the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (Θ 1 ). The crosshatched area below the dashed line represents the inbreeding condition (Θ 2 ) and the white area above the dashed line represents the outbreeding condition (Θ 3 ). The cross mark is the maximum likelihood estimative for each observed sample (y 1 , y 3 ) and its surrounding full line is the smallest contour for which Λ α has at least one element in common with Θ 1 (dashed line). The associated s-values for Θ 1 , Θ 2 and Θ 3 are presented.
• (F5): y 1 = 9, y 3 = 6 ⇒ ν x (Θ 2 ) = 0.085,
• (F6): y 1 = 9, y 3 = 7 ⇒ ν x (Θ 2 ) = 0.023.
It is also noteworthy that in two cases the maximum likelihood is in Θ 2 ∩ Θ 3 = Θ 1 , namely:
(B5) and (D5).
Concluding remarks
This paper discussed theoretical properties of the likelihood-ratio measure that go beyond the probabilistic framework. It was shown that the likelihood ratio approach can be employed by testing sharp (the dimension of the null parameter space is smaller than the original parameter space) and non-sharp hypotheses. Three types of decision are possible: accept, reject or maintain a specific null hypothesis (it depends on the type of the hypothesis and the adopted philosophy).
Moreover, it was established that the likelihood-ratio measure can be used as upper bounds for posterior probabilities for sets with relative small prior probabilities, this property is in agreement with the consistency principle of the possibility theory. These results can revitalize the potentiality and stimulate the use of the likelihood ratio approach in the statistical community.
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